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Going Beyond the Kantian Philosophy: 
On McDowell’s Hegelian Critique of Kant
Robert Stern
I
The Kant-Hegel relation has a continuing fascination for commentators on Hegel,
and understandably so: for, taking this route into the Hegelian jungle can
promise many advantages. First, it can set Hegel’s thought against a background
with which we are fairly familiar, and in a way that makes its relevance clearly
apparent; second, it can help us locate Hegel in the broader philosophical tradi-
tion, making us see that the traditional ‘analytic’ jump from Kant to Frege leaves
out a crucial period in post-Kantian thought; third, it can show Hegel in a
progressive light, as attempting to take that tradition further forward; fourth, it
can help us locate familiar philosophical issues in Hegelian thought that other-
wise can appear wholly sui generis; and finally, and perhaps most importantly of
all, focusing on this relation can help raise and crystalise some of the fascinating
ambiguities concerning Hegel’s outlook, regarding whether Hegel’s response to
Kant shows him to have been a reactionary, Romantic, pre-critical thinker, who
sought to turn the philosophical clock back to a time before Kant had written, or
a modernist, Enlightened and essentially critical one, who remained true to the
spirit if not the letter of Kant’s philosophy.
This strategy of assessing Hegel via his relation to Kant has long been used in
connection with his ethics and social thought; and it has more recently been used
to good effect in connection with his epistemology and idealist metaphysics. The
current consensus in both cases seems to be that it is misguided to set Hegel too
rigidly against Kant in these areas, and that instead Hegel should be seen as a
figure who seeks to overcome what is problematic in the Kantian project, but
nonetheless who aims to take it further forward, to ‘go beyond it’, as Hegel
himself put it.1 Thus, in ethics and social philosophy, Hegel is no longer seen as
the reactionary and conservative defender of Sittlichkeit in opposition to Kant’s
liberal ideal of Moralität, but as simply trying to complement the abstract univer-
salism of the latter with a more socially situated and historically realistic concep-
tion of the subject; whilst in epistemology and metaphysics Hegel is no longer
seen as impervious to Kant’s modernising project, but rather as trying to save that
project from certain debilitating aporiai, in a way that will make it safe against
sceptical objections. Thus, on this approach, Hegel’s importance, and to some
degree that of his contemporaries, lies in the fact that they attempted to overcome
a certain one-sidedness in Kant’s thought which they believed meant that he
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ended up giving back the ground he had won (against anti-rationalism in reli-
gion, nihilism in ethics, scepticism in epistemology, crude naturalism in meta-
physics), all in a way that was designed not to compromise the essential
‘modernity’ of Kant’s project, and his Enlightenment emphasis on freedom, the
authority of science, and the emptiness of traditional metaphysics.
In this paper, I want to focus on the epistemological side of this story, and to
explore whether it is correct to see Hegel’s work as an attempt to ‘go beyond’
Kant in a way that we can readily understand and endorse. A recent reading of
Hegel in these terms – one that is surely destined to influence others – is
presented in John McDowell’s Mind and World. McDowell’s book is of course not
a scholarly treatment or a textual commentary, but it nonetheless presents a
powerful sketch of how the Kant-Hegel relation should be seen, free of many of
the traditional prejudices against Hegel, and with a keen eye for his contempo-
rary relevance and importance: McDowell’s reading therefore provides a signifi-
cant ‘test case’ for how far Hegel can be understood as pointing the way to the
sort of ‘completion’ of the Kantian project that is engaged in by McDowell
himself, where this means finally setting aside philosophical concerns about the
relation between mind and world, which Kant (despite his best efforts) left alive,
but in a way that does not do violence to Kant’s modernising contribution to
philosophy. Is McDowell right to think that in seeking to ‘complete’ the Kantian
project, the outlook and approach to be found in Hegel are ultimately no more
anti-Kantian or pre-critical than McDowell’s own?
II
Let me begin by outlining the way in which McDowell presents the Kant-Hegel
relation, and how this favours the critical, modernist reading of Hegel and his
thought.
According to McDowell, Kant had a crucial insight that could have put an
immediate end to the to-ing and fro-ing between realism and idealism, empiri-
cism and scepticism that is a mark of the philosophical tradition up to the present,
but that he could not articulate this insight fully from within his overall concep-
tion, in which certain residual dualisms remained; it took Hegel as Kant’s succes-
sor to overcome these dualisms, and so to see Kant’s insight for what it was and
to develop it properly. McDowell’s suggestion is that Kant held the key for tran-
scending the tradition in his recognition of the shared role of intuition and
thought, receptivity and spontaneity in experience, which should have led him to
see that no space exists for a pure, unconceptualised Given between our concep-
tual powers and the external world, and thus that the world is present to us in
experience, and not hidden from us behind any veil of perception; however,
whilst Kant does not conceive of any separation between intuition and thought,
experience and judgement at the empirical level, he nonetheless makes just such
a separation again at the transcendental one, so that at this level Kant re-intro-
duces precisely the kind of concerns that he had earlier dispelled. McDowell
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diagnoses Kant’s failure here as resting on a deeper dualism, between reason and
nature, one which he traces back to the origins of the modern naturalistic world-
picture, and its separation of norms and facts, freedom and law, meaning and
brute contingency. Hegel’s contribution to this story is thus two-fold: first, whilst
building on Kant’s original insight, he is a more thoroughgoing opponent of the
Myth of the Given as for him there is no ‘boundary’ to the conceptual, no intu-
ition without concepts, no content without form; and second (although McDowell
is less explicit about this), Hegel’s critical attitude to ‘bald naturalism’ liberated
him from the underlying dualism between reason and nature that led Kant to re-
introduce a purely causal role to experience, depriving it of the conceptual
content needed to overcome the apparent gap between mind and world. Hegel’s
contribution is decisive and yet conditional: with his contribution, we can see
how liberating Kant’s central insight can be, in ways that became distorted by the
framework in which Kant himself was operating, and which Hegel was able to
discard.
One way in which McDowell brings out the double-edged nature of Kant’s
achievement, and Hegel’s significance in rescuing its true potential, is in relation
to the issue of scepticism and our knowledge of the external world. McDowell’s
attitude to scepticism is therapeutic, and he takes Kant’s basic picture to provide
just the therapy that is needed, in allowing us to return to a form of direct realism
that enables us to place sceptical worries in a proper and diminished perspective.
McDowell takes Kant’s conception of experience as conceptualised to show that
experience puts us in direct, immediate contact with the world, so that we can
reject the ‘predicament of traditional philosophy…in which we are supposed to
start from some anyway available data of consciousness, and work up to certify-
ing that they actually yield knowledge of the objective world’.2 Once we see that
there is nothing unintelligible in the idea of experience giving us ‘openness to
facts’, we will see that ‘the sceptical questions lack a kind of urgency that is essen-
tial to their troubling us … The aim here is not to answer sceptical questions, but
to begin to see how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them, to treat
them as unreal, in the way that common sense has always wanted to’.3 McDowell
clearly offers this therapeutic result as one important way in which Kant’s insight
can be of value; but of course (on McDowell’s view) its value was obscured in
Kant’s own work, by the fact that sceptical issues return to haunt the Kantian
system, in the form of his appearance/reality distinction, and the separation
between things as they appear to us and the way things are in themselves. It is
thus only once Hegel has dropped Kant’s remaining dualisms that the spectre of
scepticism can be banished once and for all, after the terms of the epistemological
tradition have been superseded.
Now, for anyone interested in Hegel and his work, it is hard not to be seduced
by the reading of Hegel that McDowell offers us here, as a way in which one
could ‘start to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy’,4 as McDowell puts it.
First, it presents us with an account of Hegel that is essentially progressive, where
this means treating Hegel as a follower of Kant, in respecting the strictures of the
Critical Philosophy against abstract metaphysics and speculative theorizing.
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Thus, in contrast to many traditional readings – which present Hegel as either a
spirit monist or quasi-Platonist, and so as seeking to go back to the kind of high
rationalist tradition which Kant overturned – McDowell’s account presents us
with a Hegel that was no intellectual reactionary in this way. McDowell’s picture
of Hegel is therefore in accord with the general interpretative sentiment that has
recently been expressed by Robert Pippin, a sentiment that is hard to resist if one
wants to avoid treating Hegel as a philosophical anachronism, both in his time
and in ours:
much of the standard view of how Hegel passes beyond Kant into spec-
ulative philosophy makes very puzzling, to the point of unintelligibility,
how Hegel could have been the post-Kantian philosopher he understood
himself to be; that is, how he could have accepted, as he did, Kant’s reve-
lations about the fundamental inadequacies of the metaphysical tradi-
tion, could have enthusiastically agreed with Kant that the metaphysics
of the ‘beyond,’ of substance, and of traditional views of God and infin-
ity were forever discredited, and then could have promptly created a
systematic metaphysics as if he had never heard of Kant’s critical episte-
mology. Just attributing moderate philosophic intelligence to Hegel
should at least make one hesitate before construing him as a post-Kantian
philosopher with a precritical metaphysics.5
In this sense, McDowell’s conception of Hegel is compelling. Secondly, and relat-
edly, McDowell’s reading shows how one might go about defending and
supporting some of Hegel’s characteristic claims and attitudes, but in ways that
show them to be more defensible and attractive than they have appeared hitherto.
Thus, in particular, McDowell’s own defense of a ‘relaxed naturalism’ or ‘natu-
ralised platonism’, and his associated idea of a ‘second nature’, offers us a way
out of an overly Romanticised view of Hegel’s attitude to nature, science and the
scientific revolution, placing Hegel’s evident anti-naturalism within sensible
bounds. Thirdly, McDowell’s account sounds the right notes, ones that have an
authentically Hegelian ring: the need to transcend dualisms, to complete Kant’s
project, to set scepticism on one side, even the importance McDowell gives
(which I have not gone in to) to traditions and cultures.6 This is a Hegel it is easy
and tempting to live with: domesticated, indeed.
However, before accepting that McDowell succeeds in bringing out what lies
at the heart of the Hegelian project, and that he places it in a context that makes
good sense of that project philosophically, historically and interpretatively, there
are certain worries that need to be addressed. These worries can be expressed as
a set of questions, which will be dealt with in the following sections: First, can
Hegel’s epistemological position be assimilated to the kind of direct realism
McDowell defends, and is McDowell right to think this position can prevent scep-
tical concerns being raised? Second, in giving Hegel credit for overcoming a
certain tension in the Kantian position, has McDowell succumbed to a historical
myth regarding the nature of that position, leading him to credit Hegel with a
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significance he does not deserve? And thirdly, how far is McDowell’s conception
of the Kant-Hegel relation accurate from the Hegelian point of view; that is, how
far does it relate to what Hegel himself was really trying to do in ‘going beyond’
Kant, and thus how far does it capture the true significance of the Hegelian turn?
I now offer a treatment of each of these questions, against which McDowell’s
account of Hegel needs to be measured. I will offer a defense of McDowell’s read-
ing of Hegel in relation to the first two questions, but a critique of it in relation to
the third.
III
In presenting his case that passive experiences belong to the conceptual sphere,
in so far as they possess conceptual content, and thus in arguing that the concep-
tual is ‘unbounded’, McDowell goes out of his way to emphasise two points: first,
that this contrasts with a kind of anti-foundationalist coherentism (which
McDowell attributes to Davidson) which sees no way to accommodate experience
within the space of reasons; and second, that the thesis of ‘unboundedness’ in no
way commits his position to idealism. In making these points, McDowell might
be read by many as making a break with Hegel; is he therefore right to insist that
(on the contrary) these points mark his continuity with the Hegelian outlook?
This question arises, because if anyone is held to be a coherentist within the tradi-
tion, it is usually Hegel; and if anyone is held to embrace idealism without
reserve, it is also Hegel: so how can McDowell be right to claim any sort of
grounds for allegiance on these matters?
On the coherentism issue, a Kantian critic of McDowell who has claimed that
McDowell is confused here, and that he is mistaken in taking Hegel or any of the
post-Kantian idealists as an ally, is Michael Friedman. Friedman has argued that
these post-Kantians end up abandoning Kant’s insistence on the two-fold depen-
dence of intuitions on concepts and concepts on intuitions (a two-fold depen-
dence McDowell wants to retain), and so slip into a kind of coherentism inimical
to McDowell’s (right-minded) commitment to the authority of experience.
Friedman writes as follows:
It is characteristic of post-Kantian absolute idealism (and, indeed, of
virtually all post-Kantian philosophy) to reject Kant’s dualistic concep-
tion of our rational faculties as divided between pure sensibility on the
one side and pure understanding on the other. And this means, accord-
ingly, that Kant’s way of drawing a distinction between the faculties of
reason and understanding must also be rejected, since, as we have just
seen, the difference between these two faculties, for Kant, is simply that
the latter must operate in cooperation with sensibility (on pain of empti-
ness) whereas the former can operate entirely independently of sensibil-
ity. Moreover, it is also characteristic of post-Kantian absolute idealism to
take the Kantian faculty of reason rather than the Kantian faculty of
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understanding as the model for rationality as such – and, indeed, to take
the rational freedom required by morality as the model for all rationality.
The combined effect of these two moves, then, is a tendency to distance
rational thought from sensible experience and to minimize the empiricist
elements in Kant’s own conception. For, on the one hand, the Kantian
bridge between rational thought and sensory perception – pure intuition
and its schematism by the understanding – has now been self-consciously
rejected. And, on the other hand, our new conception of rational thought
is now modelled on the Kantian faculty of reason – a faculty requiring no
cooperation from an independent faculty of pure sensibility. So it is not
surprising, then, when post-Kantian idealism eventually leads to explic-
itly Coherentist conceptions of the objects of rational knowledge…7
On this reading, the transition from Kant to Hegel is more like a revolution than
a natural progression, in which just the kind of common-sense realism McDowell
seeks to defend is a casualty, not a survivor.
Indirect confirmation for Friedman’s misgivings here, concerning Hegel’s suit-
ability as an ally for McDowell, may seem to come from a recent essay by Richard
Rorty, where he criticises McDowell for his residual empiricist leanings, and
invokes Hegel in support of that criticism, aligning Hegel with a more thorough-
going anti-foundationalism. Rorty writes: ‘From a Sellarsian, Davidsonian,
Brandonian, or Hegelian viewpoint, there is no clear need for what McDowell
describes as a “ ‘minimal empiricism’: the idea that experience must constitute a
tribunal mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it
must be if we are to make sense of it as thinking at all”.’8 In support of his anti-
empiricist reading of Hegel, Rorty quotes Sellars’ well-known description of
Hegel as ‘the great foe of immediacy’.9
Although Friedman’s misgivings would therefore seem to conform to the sort
of picture of Hegel presented by Rorty, it is not clear that they can be textually
supported, however: for, like McDowell, Hegel often writes as if it is just obvious
that our basic and fundamental access to the empirical world is experiential, and
as such must be seen to be unproblematic, if scepticism is to be avoided. No more
than McDowell, of course, does Hegel take this to be an endorsement of empiricism
as philosophically conceived: for, like McDowell, Hegel sees empiricism as putting
just this source of knowledge in jeopardy. Nonetheless, as he says in the
Encyclopaedia Logic, at the root of empiricism likes the ‘great principle that what is
true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception’,10 while he remarks
of the ‘old saying’ that ‘Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu’ (‘There is noth-
ing in the intellect that has not been in sense experience’) that ‘if speculative
philosophy refused to admit this principle, it can only have done so from a misun-
derstanding’.11 In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in the section on Locke,
he states his commitment to the role of experience at greater length:
As to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is true that
man commences with experience if he desires to arrive at thought.
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Everything is experienced, not merely what is sensuous, but also what
excites and stimulates my mind. Consciousness thus undoubtedly obtains
all conceptions and Notions from experience and in experience; the only
question is what we understand by experience. In a usual way when this
is spoken of the idea of nothing particular is conveyed; we speak of it as
of something quite well known. But experience is nothing more than the
form of objectivity; to say that it is something which is in consciousness
means that it has objective form for consciousness or that consciousness
experiences it, it sees it as an objective. Experience thus signifies immedi-
ate knowledge, perception, i.e. I myself must have and be something, and
the consciousness of what I have and am is experience. Now there is no
question as to this, that whatever we know, of whatever kind it may be,
must be experienced, that rests in the conception of the thing. It is absurd
to say that one knows anything which is not in experience.12
It is hard to see, in the face of these passages and others, how Friedman can be
justified in warning McDowell to steer clear of Hegel, if he wants to preserve his
foundationalist respect for experience as a source of knowledge.
Moreover, if we align Hegel with McDowell’s form of empiricism (rather than
setting them in opposition, as Rorty urges) it seems to me to open up a more fruit-
ful way of understanding important aspects of Hegel’s position and approach. So,
for example, whilst it is traditional to read the opening arguments of the
Phenomenology in an anti-empiricist manner, I believe they are better read as an
analysis or reconstruction of what the content of experience must be, what ‘the
shape of the world [is] as we find it’ (as McDowell puts it),13 and thus of how
beliefs about the world relate directly to our experience of it in this way: that is,
by showing that no awareness at the level of sense-certainty is possible,
consciousness is forced to recognise that it has a more complex experience of the
world, of the sort that comes with perception, and so is forced to alter its concep-
tion of what there is accordingly. This does not mean, however, that McDowell
need deny Sellars’ description of Hegel as ‘the great foe of immediacy’: for, I take
it, McDowell would himself accept that when he talks of ‘experience’ and its
content, he certainly does not think of this content as a pure, unconceptualised
(and hence immediate) ‘given’.
We may now then turn to a parallel worry that might be raised regarding the
issue of how McDowell’s championing of Hegel can be squared with his
(McDowell’s) commitment to realism, and his insistence that the ‘unbounded-
ness’ thesis is in no sense objectionably idealistic in its implications.14 First, how
can McDowell claim allegiance to Hegel, when the latter is self-evidently an ideal-
ist – indeed, perhaps the most thoroughgoing idealist there ever was? And, given
their shared outlook, how can McDowell prevent his own position from becom-
ing as idealistic as Hegel’s own?
Now, again, it seems to me that McDowell can hold the line here. It is of course
true, as before, that the traditional picture of Hegel takes his idealism to be thor-
oughgoing:15 but it has been argued recently that it is by no means clear that
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when Hegel characterised his outlook in these terms, he meant what we now
mean by them.16 To put the point schematically: whereas for us, idealism is to be
opposed to realism or objectivism (the thesis that reality is mind-independent),
for Hegel idealism was opposed to materialism or nominalism (the thesis that our
only theoretical commitment need be to individual, material entities). Thus, in
calling himself an idealist, Hegel intended to signal his allegiance to a certain
conceptual realism,17 rather than to the dependence of the external world on a
constructive mind: hence the epithet objective idealism, as against the subjective
idealism of Kant. There is therefore no need to take McDowell’s position here to
be at odds with Hegel’s.
However, even if it is accepted that both McDowell and Hegel share a similar
stance, in attempting to hold to realism whilst occupying a middle ground
between coherentism on the one hand and the Myth of the Given on the other, it
is still possible to argue that this middle ground is unstable, and must collapse
back into just the sort of idealism which (it is now accepted) both McDowell and
Hegel want to avoid. This point is argued by Friedman, who suggests that
McDowell’s realism rests merely on his insistence that experience is passive, in a
way that can reassure us that here we have some sort of ‘friction’ with the outside
world; but, Friedman argues (much as Hume did against Descartes),18 such
passivity is a feature of our inner experience too, so that (as Friedman puts it)
the distinction between passive experience (concerning which we are
simply ‘struck’ one way or another, as it were) and active judgement
(concerning which we have free choice) is not at all the same as the
distinction between that which expresses constraint by an independent
objective world and that which does not. The crucial question, in this
regard, concerns rather how we distinguish between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’
sense.19
Friedman then suggests that McDowell’s only response here is to appeal to the
kind of coherence we can give to certain impressions, as the ‘understanding inte-
grates such [outer] impressions into an evolving world-conception’;20 but, he then
objects, McDowell has failed to escape from the kind of coherentist idealism he
sought to avoid.
It seems to me that Friedman underestimates McDowell’s resources here,
however. There are two issues that need to be distinguished: on what grounds
can we hold that the object of my experience is part of the external, objective
world; and on what grounds can we hold that our judgements have any claim to
be true, rather than mere ‘fabrications’. Now, I take it, the receptivity point is
meant to answer the latter concern: because our judgements involve a passive
element, there is a ‘reassurance’ here that thought is constrained by the world
(this is the intuition behind the Myth of the Given which McDowell wishes to
accommodate). However, McDowell does not need to use this point to answer the
former concern: for this can surely be answered by appeal to the content of the
experience itself, namely whether the experience is as of something in space
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outside us (a chair, a house, a rainbow), or something in inner space (a pain, a
sensation). It is precisely because McDowell acknowledges that experience comes
with this degree of articulation, that he can appeal to experience to distinguish
between inner and outer sense: he does not need receptivity to act as a kind of
criterion, in the way that Friedman takes it to be used. Thus, the fact that both
inner and outer sense involve receptivity does not mean we have no grounds for
distinguishing between them; whilst at the same time, he can argue that in both
cases our perceptual judgements involve ‘friction’, and so can claim to put us in
touch with something that is not itself a construction of thought.21
IV
Having shown how McDowell’s stance on the issues of idealism/realism and
coherentism/foundationalism can rightly be said to resemble Hegel’s, I now turn
to the second question I presented for consideration: namely, in suggesting that
Hegel enables us to see Kant’s achievement for what it is, is McDowell distorting
the significance of Hegel’s contribution, and uncritically following a mistaken
picture of the Kant-Hegel relation originally painted by Hegel himself, as part of
his own misguided and self-aggrandising account of his historical place and
significance? Thus, where McDowell claims that Kant was unable to give his
‘liberating thought … proper shape’22 and that a Hegelian move was required
before it could be made to realize its true philosophical potential, is McDowell
merely succumbing to Hegelian propaganda, and failing to recognise that Kant
never needed ‘completing’ in this way?
This is certainly how McDowell’s position looks to many contemporary
Kantians, who argue that McDowell is simply wrong to suggest that Kant’s ‘liber-
ating thought’ ever suffered any distortion or diminution within Kant’s own
picture, so the transition from Kant to Hegel is superfluous and philosophically
unmotivated. These Kantians (such as Graham Bird, Michael Friedman and
Henry Allison)23 all make essentially the same point: that where McDowell sees
such distortion taking place, this is because he has a simplistic and wrongheaded
conception of what Kant was doing, and that in fact his original achievement is
never really compromised; moreover, McDowell shares this simplistic and
wrong-headed conception with Hegel, so both see a role for themselves in
‘saving’ Kant from himself, when he was never really ‘lost’ in the first place.
McDowell has misperceived the situation here, these Kantians claim, because he
has uncritically accepted a conception of Kant’s transcendental idealism that can
be found in Hegel and is echoed in Strawson and others, to the effect that there
remained in Kant’s work a commitment to an unknowable or supersensible realm
of ‘things-in-themselves’; as a result, McDowell is mistakenly led to the conclu-
sion that it is Hegel (along with the other post-Kantian idealists) who ‘frees Kant’s
insight so that it can protect a commonsense respect for the independence of the
ordinary world’.24
Now, in my view McDowell (like Hegel) rather invites a certain degree of
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well-taken criticism from Kantians here, when he makes it appear that Hegel’s
advance over Kant was simply to dispense with the supersensuous thing-in-itself,
which had served to compromise the realism to which Kant’s conception of expe-
rience should have led him. Thus, McDowell writes as follows:
At the end my second lecture … I said that if we take Kant’s conception
of experience out of the frame he puts it in, a story about a transcenden-
tal affection of receptivity by a supersensible reality, it becomes just what
we need. Outside that frame, Kant’s conception is a satisfactory way to
avoid our dilemma, the apparently forced choice between the Myth of the
Given and a coherentism that renounces external constraints on thinking.
But the frame spoils the insight, because the radical mind-independence
of the supersensible comes to seem exemplary of what any genuine
mind-independence would be, and then when Kant purports to attribute
mind-independence to the ordinary empirical world, as it figures in his
thinking, that looks merely disingenuous.25
Put like this, it is perhaps understandable why many Kantians think that those
(like McDowell) who give Hegel such a vital role in ‘protecting a commonsense
respect for the independence of the ordinary world’ do so because they have a
simplistic view of Kant’s position, and in particular of his conception of the
distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. On this view,
McDowell and Hegel are mistaken in adopting what has become known as a
‘two-worlds’ account of this distinction, rather than a weaker ‘two-aspect’
account;26 and they have therefore failed to see how nothing in Kant’s position in
any way compromises Kant’s realism, or implies that he took the ontological
status of the empirical world to be ‘second-rate’. Thus, Bird and others argue that
there is nothing in Kant’s talk of things-in-themselves that should frighten
McDowell, or make him think that the realist insights he finds in Kant need to be
transplanted to Hegelian soil in order to grow.
I take it, however, that McDowell’s misgivings go deeper than this, and that
if he fears any lack of realism in Kant, it is not just because he believes (rightly
or wrongly) that for Kant ‘mind-independence’ comes in two forms (empirical
and transcendental). Rather, as McDowell makes clear in other passages, Kant’s
realism is compromised not by the appearances/things-in-themselves distinc-
tion as such (however this is to be understood), but by the way in which at some
level, Kant is prepared to see receptivity and spontaneity, intuitions and
concepts, as separable, and thus to see the latter as operating on the former, in a
way that gives content to the idea that conceptual structure is imposed on an
intrinsically unstructured Given. It is this dualism of form and content, rather
than dualism of appearance and things-in-themselves, that McDowell thinks
Kant failed to escape completely, by failing to go as far as Hegel, and allow that
‘conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity, not exercised on some
supposedly prior deliverances of receptivity’,27 all the way down. Hegel himself
puts this worry as follows:
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From this exposition we may gather briefly what transcendental knowl-
edge is in this [Kantian] philosophy. The deduction of the categories,
setting out from the organic Idea of productive imagination, loses itself in
the mechanical relation of a unity of self-consciousness which stands in
antithesis to the empirical manifold, either determining it or reflecting on
it. Thus transcendental knowledge transforms itself into formal knowl-
edge. The unity of self-conciousness is at the same time objective unity,
category, formal identity. However, something that is not determined by
this identity must supervene to it in an incomprehensible fashion; there
must be an addition, a plus, of something empirical, something alien. This
supervening of B to the pure Ego-concept [which is A] is called experi-
ence, while the supervening of A to B, when B is posited first, is called
rational action, [and the formula for both is] A: A + B. The A in A + B is
the objective unity of self-consciousness, B is the empirical, the content of
experience, a manifold bound together through the unity A. But B is
something foreign to A, something not contained in it. And the plus itself,
i.e., the bond between the binding activity and the manifold, is what is
incomprehensible.28
If this is the essence of the Hegelian critique of Kant, what are the implications
he takes from it? Kantians characteristically assume that Hegel’s conclusion
here was that Kant was a phenomenalistic idealist, to which they reply that
Kant was an empirical realist, and that (as Allison puts it), ‘when Kant claims
that he is an empirical realist and denies that he is a transcendental realist, he
is really affirming that our experience is not limited to the private domain of
our own representations, but includes an encounter with “empirically real”
spatio-temporal objects’.29 What can a Hegelian like McDowell find to object to
here? Isn’t this just the kind of direct realism and ‘openness’ to the world that
McDowell himself champions? Doesn’t this show that there is nothing in
Kant’s talk of ‘appearances’ that should lead us to think that he leaves room for
scepticism, and that his commitment to common-sense realism is merely half-
hearted?
The Kantians arguably make things too easy for themselves here, however: for
it is clear in Hegel that his diagnosis of an unresolved dualism in Kant does not
arise because he thinks Kant just slips back into the kind of idealism to be found
in his empiricist predecessors like Berkeley and Hume; the Kantians are therefore
wrong to think that they can deflect Hegelian concerns, merely by emphasising
the gap between Kant and the phenomenalists (as Kant himself had done in the
Refutation of Idealism). For these concerns relate not to Kant qua phenomenalist,
but to Kant qua relativist, who writes concerning space (for example) that
It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of
space, of extended things, etc… If we depart from the subjective condi-
tion under which alone we can have outer intuition, the representation of
space stands for nothing whatsoever.30
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It is Kant’s claim regarding the relativity of our knowledge that Hegel traces back
to the form/content distinction, and which for Hegel is the primary implication
of Kant’s doctrine of synthesis, where it becomes possible to treat our conception
of the world as perspectival, as not conforming to how things would look from
the standpoint of an absolute intellect. Thus, in opposition to the view just cited
from Kant, when Hegel comes talk about space and spatial perception for exam-
ple, he uses the form/content debate to distance himself from any kind of Kantian
relativism on this matter (as he does elsewhere concerning the categories them-
selves):31
But when we said that what is sensed receives from the intuiting mind
the form of the spatial and temporal, this statement must not be under-
stood to mean that space and time are only subjective forms. This is what
Kant wanted to make them. But things are in truth themselves spatial and
temporal; this double form of asunderness is not one-sidedly given to
them by our own intuition, but has been originally imparted to them by
the intrinsically infinite mind, by the creative eternal Idea. Since, there-
fore, our intuitive mind honours the determinations of sensation by
giving them the abstract form of space and time, thereby making them
into real objects as well as assimilating them to itself, the supposition of
subjective idealism that we receive only the subjective results of our deter-
mining activity and not the object’s own determinations is completely
refuted.32
The issue between Hegel and Kant is therefore not primarily a phenomenalistic
one, in the sense that Hegel took Kant to be claiming that nothing except knowl-
edge of our mental states is possible for us: rather, Hegel’s concern was a rela-
tivist one, that in coming to know about things outside us in space and time, we
do not  – for Kant – really gain any insight into how reality is intrinsically, as it is
only valid to refer to the spatial and temporal characteristics of things from
within our conceptual framework.
Now, whilst a revisionary Kantian like Bird is strenuous in his efforts to defend
Kant against the charge of phenomenalism, he seems happy to accept the impu-
tation of relativism, which (I claim) is the real focus of Hegel’s concern. Thus,
commenting on the passage from Kant I have just cited, Bird writes:
… the reference to the ‘human standpoint’ can now be understood not as
a commitment to the traditional dualism of subjective representation and
objective world, but to that developed human experience and the project
of mapping it. The passage shows too how we can understand in a non-
traditional way the claim that space and time are nothing apart from our
representations (e.g. B44). For it can be understood to claim not that space
and time are constructed from our sensations, nor that they belong to the
category of sensations, both of which Kant in any case explicitly denies,
but that they have a role only within the scope of our human experience.33
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From a Hegelian perspective, it seems to me that Bird’s Kantian picture still
retains those elements which Hegel wanted to overcome, elements he took to be
unavoidable once anything like a form/content distinction is at work: in accept-
ing those elements, I do not see how Bird’s Kantianism can avoid succumbing to
this Hegelian diagnosis, even put in a ‘two-aspects’, non-phenomenalist form.
I am unsure, however, how much of this McDowell would also want to take
on board, as part of his Hegelianism. On the one hand, McDowell objects (as I
have done on Hegel’s behalf) that his reservations about Kant are not based on a
phenomenalistic reading;34 so, he presumably does not see Kant’s separation of
spontaneity and receptivity as operating at anything like the level it does in
Berkeley or Hume. On the other hand, I am not sure whether he would be will-
ing to go as far as (I claim) Hegel himself does, in tracing back the ‘dark side’ of
Kant to his apparent ‘humility’, regarding the merely perspectival nature of
human knowledge. For, on my view, Hegel takes it that the only way out of
Kant’s perspectivalism here is to endorse a kind of conceptual or Aristotelian
realism, whereby the world has a certain structure of its own, that can be articu-
lated by us in thought; the epistemological realism McDowell admires in Hegel is
thus tied up with an essentialist realism, in a way that I am not sure McDowell
recognises or would endorse.35 On the one hand, McDowell has been consistently
critical of a crude primary/secondary quality distinction which would seem to
make much of our conception of the world merely relativistic; but on the other
hand, I have been unable to find in McDowell any real engagement with the
Putnamian ‘internal realist’, who takes it that there is no one, ‘fixed’ description of
reality to which we should aspire, a conception that Hegel himself would seem to
need to make sense of his notion of absolute knowledge as a determinate stand-
point.
Nonetheless, we have found no reason thus far to conclude either that
McDowell’s project is at odds with Hegel’s own, or that this shared outlook is
rendered redundant by the sort of revisionary Kantianism defended by Bird et al.
In both respects, the outcome of our investigations has been positive. In the final
section of this paper, however, we will find reason to take a more critical stance
to McDowell’s reading of Hegel.
V
In this final section of the paper, I wish to consider how far McDowell’s attempt
to ‘domesticate’ Hegel can really help us to come to terms with the Hegelian
perspective as a whole, and how much of Hegel’s distinctive vision can be
‘redeemed’ thereby. I have already said that McDowell’s picture is certainly an
attractive one: but how far is McDowell right to read Hegel in the spirit he does?
I do not intend to review Hegel’s outlook in its entirety, but to concentrate on the
focus of McDowell’s account – the Kant-Hegel relation and Hegel’s completion of
the Kantian project – and to assess how far it fits the way in which Hegel himself
saw the issues that separated him from his great predecessor.
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In his account, as we have seen, McDowell takes it that it is Kant’s inability to
fully set aside scepticism, in favour of ‘common sense’ realism, that Hegel saw as
the limitation in Kant’s outlook, and in seeking to return us to this common-sense
realism, McDowell takes Hegel as his ally. Now, I certainly see nothing wrong in
this as far as it goes (pace Friedman and others), in so far as I see nothing in Hegel
that is at odds with this realism at an epistemological level, in the sense that
Hegel had no sceptical doubts concerning such realism, and no epistemological
machinery (coherentism, constructivism, relativism or whatever) that should
lead one to think his answer to such doubts was qualified in some way. My
worry, however, is that in presenting this issue as the focus of the Kant-Hegel
debate, we have a picture of that debate that is curiously truncated, where the
questions that seem to have mattered most to Hegel in his encounter with Kant
get left out. To put the contrast simplistically: while McDowell wants to vindicate
common sense, to put us back in touch with tables, cats and other people, and
while Hegel is certainly no sceptic on this score,36 Hegel wants much more – to
vindicate a kind of conception of philosophy that Kant had thought was impos-
sible, and which would also appear to have no place in McDowell’s therapeutic,
late-Wittgensteinian outlook.37 I will first illustrate this gulf in philosophical
temperament and ambition, and then consider how far this gulf stands in the
way of McDowell’s attempt to appropriate and ‘domesticate’ Hegel in the way
he does.
The gulf is at its clearest in those passages in Hegel where he discusses Kant
explicitly, and sets out where he sees himself at odds with the Kantian outlook.
Whereas McDowell takes it that Hegel’s primary concern is to close off the space
in Kant which leaves room for scepticism regarding our knowledge of the exter-
nal world, many of his best-known arguments against Kant (for example, his crit-
icism of Kant’s reflective stance, taking our faculties to be instruments) are
directed at his metaphysical modesty, not at any tendency in Kant towards scep-
ticism regarding the external world.38 In the following passage, Hegel makes
clear that he sees such metaphysical modesty as culturally and intellectually
disastrous:
The fact is that there no longer exists any interest either in the form or the
content of metaphysics or in both together. If it is remarkable when a
nation has become indifferent to its constitutional theory, to its national
sentiments, its ethical customs and virtues, it is certainly no less remark-
able when a nation loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which contem-
plates its own pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life of the
nation.
The esoteric teaching of the Kantian philosophy – that the understand-
ing ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will
become a theoretical reason which by itself generates nothing but fancies
of the brain – this was a justification from a philosophical quarter for the
renunciation of speculative thought. In support of this popular teaching
came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the time
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demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience
was the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private
life, practice and practical training generally were essential and alone
necessary, theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy and ordi-
nary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of
metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation
without a metaphysics – like a temple richly ornamented in other
respects but without a holy of holies.39
In passages such as these, it is plain that Hegel does not see Kantianism as incom-
plete because it fails to uphold common-sense realism, but rather because it fails
to uphold philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular, in a way that is
needed (Hegel thinks) to prevent a more culturally significant ‘see-saw’, between
crude materialism, eudaimonism and radicalism on the one hand, and empty
fideism, pietism and conservatism on the other. It is plain that for Hegel, complet-
ing the Kantian project has a much broader agenda than that represented by
McDowell, or put forward by him as the central issue.
Now, in claiming that Hegel’s ultimate concern in getting beyond Kant was to
‘give the nation back its metaphysics’, and that the error of Kantianism was to
play into the hands of those forces that had sought to take it away, it may be
thought that I am making the mistake that Pippin and others have recently urged
Hegelians to avoid: namely, presenting Hegel as a throw-back to a pre-Critical
age, as a nostalgic Hellenist ultimately out of step with the direction of progres-
sive philosophical thinking. More particularly: if this is Hegel’s goal, hasn’t he
fallen into the trap he himself identified, of ‘going further’ than Kant by going
backwards, not forwards, by repudiating the Kantian project, not ‘completing it’?
In response, there are three points to be made here. First, in taking the central
issue to be about the role and status of metaphysics as a subject, there is no reason
to think Hegel was addressing an issue of no concern to Kant himself. In the
Preface to the second edition of the first Critique, Kant famously presents himself
as the saviour of metaphysics, putting it at last on the ‘sure road to science’,40
where this is put forward as the ultimate goal and rationale for the Copernican
revolution brought about by transcendental idealism. To Hegel, however, this
promise was unfulfilled, as it seemed to him that Kant did not solve the problems
of metaphysics in this way, but rather put their resolution beyond the limits of
human understanding, in a Lockean manner.41 For Hegel, therefore, Kant went
back on his word, when he claimed in the Preface to the first edition of the
Critique that ‘I have not evaded its [i.e. metaphysics’] questions by pleading the
insufficiency of human reason’:42 Hegel argued that by holding that reason was
operative only within certain limits, this was precisely what Kant had done.
In response to this first point, it may be said that it does Hegel few favours: for
it just shows how far he misunderstood Kant’s essentially therapeutic attitude to
the traditional problems of metaphysics, where his aim was not to settle meta-
physical questions by declaring them unanswerable, but by showing that they
should never have been asked. This response would seem justified; but behind
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the first point lies a second, perhaps deeper one: namely, that in setting out to
save philosophy from the emptiness of traditional metaphysics, Kant had
promised to give philosophy a new and more fruitful role, particularly in relation
to the sciences, by giving it the function of grounding the latter. For Hegel,
however, this way of renewing philosophy was essentially misconceived, and
took away from philosophical enquiry its proper significance, as going beyond
and standing above the empirical sciences.43
In making his case here, it is striking how far Hegel’s argument has a cultural
and ethical dimension (in the broad sense): that is, it clearly appeared to him that
Kant’s critical philosophy could not sustain itself in cultural terms, in relation to
the sciences, arts and religious thought, whilst a culture that lacked philosophy as
the highest intellectual expression of its values and world-view would deprive
individuals of a vital element in human self-realisation and well-being. Hegel’s
outlook here is profoundly Aristotelian, as can be seen from the following
passage from his introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, given
in the 1820s:
The history of philosophy displays to us the achievements of reason in
thinking. Political- or world-history deals with the achievements of reason
in willing, achievements of great men and of states. We learn from it how
this reason reveals itself in the origin, growth, and downfall of states. The
history of art deals with Ideas in the form of imagination which brings
Ideas before our perception. The history of philosophy deals with the
Ideas in the form of thinking. It presents conscious thinking, puts before
us the heroes of thinking, of pure thinking, for our consideration of their
achievements. The achievement is the more excellent the less the particu-
lar character of its author has imposed his seal on it. It is in philosophy
that the particular (i.e. the particular or private activity of the philoso-
pher) disappears, and all that remains is the field of pure thought.
Compare this field with others and you have to regard it as the noblest
and most excellent, since thinking is the activity which signalizes man.
Man is thoughtful in everything, but in feeling, e.g., in perceiving, will-
ing, imagining, he is not purely thinking, in philosophy alone is pure
thinking possible; there, therefore, thinking is free from all natural deter-
minants, from all particularities. This is the fundamental thing which we
will consider in its movement.44
Hegel consistently criticises Kant for putting this cultural pre-eminence of philos-
ophy in jeopardy, by no longer allowing it to be an activity of ‘pure thought’, with
important consequences for the intellectual and spiritual life of mankind.
The third point, then, concerns how Hegel believed this renewal of philosophy
could be achieved, and what kind of return to metaphysics was required in order to
bring it about. Hegel himself presents his Logic as the centre piece of this renewed
philosophical culture; but many interpreters consciously down-play its metaphys-
ical pretensions, and its apparently Platonic aspects, where one motivation for
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doing so is (again) to prevent Hegel from looking too out of step with Kant’s
Critical Philosophy, according to which (as Pippin has it) ‘the metaphysics of the
“beyond”… were forever discredited’. However, it could be argued that this
humanistic, ‘finitist’ account, as an interpretation of Kant’s own position, is in fact
mistaken and anachronistic: thus, as Ameriks has noted against Pippin, ‘it really
is not clear, or even a clearly traditional view, that Kant jettisoned the metaphysics
of the traditional past, for on his ultimate ontology, as filled out by pure practical
reason, God and the moral self, for example, remain standing as substances
“beyond” space and time and its finite limitations’.45
Now, the irony here is that once this aspect of Hegel’s critique of Kant is taken
seriously, it can be seen that McDowell’s appropriation of Hegel in defence of
‘common-sense realism’ is seriously one-sided and off-key: for, as Hegel himself
repeatedly makes plain, it is just such realism that is the enemy of the exalted
conception of philosophy he wishes to champion, where the understanding is
transfigured by reason, the finite by the infinite, correctness by Truth. At bottom,
therefore, Hegel’s critique of Kant is not that he transgresses common-sense real-
ism as such, to which he must be brought back, but rather that Kant does so in a
wholly negative way; in seeking to overcome Kant’s scepticism, therefore, Hegel
is still no more a friend of ‘common-sense realism’ than was Kant himself, but for
positive reasons, connected not with epistemology and scepticism and the
attempt by philosophy to ground the sciences, but with metaphysics and the
attempt by philosophy to stand above them. The following passage brings out
clearly, I think, how it is that McDowell’s ‘domesticated’ reading of Hegel gets the
Kant-Hegel critique inside out: for, while it is indeed anti-sceptical, it is a critique
not in the service of common-sense realism (aimed at returning us to the ‘ordi-
nary’, in a Wittgensteinian manner), but of philosophy, where in Hegel’s mind
these two outlooks are not the same, but are clearly distinguished:
As for the interpretation of the objects of our immediate consciousness,
which form the content of empirical cognition, as mere appearances, this
anyway must be regarded as a very important result of the Kantian philos-
ophy. For our ordinary consciousness (i.e., the consciousness as the level of
sense-perception and understanding) the objects that it knows count as
self-standing and self-founded in their isolation from one another, their
mutual dependence on one another is regarded as something external to
the object, and not as belonging to their nature. It must certainly be main-
tained against this that the objects of which we have immediate knowledge
are mere appearances, i.e., they do not have the ground of their being
within themselves, but within something else. The further question, then,
is how this other is determined. According to the Kantian philosophy, the
things that we know about are only appearances for us, and what they are
in themselves remains for us an inaccessible beyond.
The naive consciousness has rightly taken exception to this subjective
idealism, according to which the content of our consciousness is some-
thing that is only ours, something posited only through us. In fact, the
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true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge
are mere appearances, not only for us, but also in themselves, and that the
proper determination of these things, which are in this sense ‘finite’,
consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in
the universal divine Idea. This interpretation must also be called ideal-
ism, but, as distinct from the subjective idealism of the Critical
Philosophy, it is absolute idealism. Although it transcends the ordinary
realistic consciousness, still, this absolute idealism can hardly be
regarded as the private property of philosophy in actual fact, because, on
the contrary, it forms the basis of all religious consciousness. This is
because religion, too, regards the sum total of everything that is there, in
short, the world before us, as created and governed by God.46
Taking passages such as these seriously, it is hard to see how Hegel’s greatest
concern in criticising Kant was to bring off a therapeutic escape from philosophy,
and not rather to find a deepening role for philosophic thought in a culture for
which anything other than common sense is increasingly unthinkable.47 It is
ironic, therefore, that McDowell (and, in a different way, Rorty)48 should take
themselves to be representing an authentically Hegelian outlook, when they
argue for greater philosophical quietism and modesty in the face of this culture,
rather than less:49 for, in his critique of Kant, it appears that Hegel was insisting








1 cf. Hegel 1991: §41 Addition 1, p. 82:
Nowadays we have gone beyond the Kantian philosophy, and everyone wants
to go further. There are two ways of going further, however: one can go forward
or backward. Looked at in the clear light of day, many of our philosophical
endeavours are nothing but the (mistaken) procedure of the older metaphysics,
an uncritical thinking on and on [Dahindenken], of the kind that anyone can do.
2 McDowell 1994: 112.
3 ibid., p. 113.
4 ibid., p. 44. In general, McDowell’s contribution has been warmly welcomed by
Hegel scholars: see, for example, Sedgwick 1997 and forthcoming.
5 Pippin 1989: 7.
6 The latter is presented in Gadamerian terms: but given the continuities that exist
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between Gadamer and Hegel, McDowell’s thoughts here could be related to the latter also.
See McDowell 1994: 98–9.
7 Friedman 1996: 439–40.
8 Rorty 1998b: 140. The citation from McDowell comes from McDowell 1996: xii.
9 Sellars 1997: §1, p.13.
10 Hegel 1991: §38, p. 77.
11 ibid., §8, p. 32 (translation modified). It is striking that Hegel’s attitude to this prin-
ciple differs widely from Rorty’s: ‘Sellars and Davidson can both be read as saying that
Aristotle’s slogan, “Nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses”, was
a wildly misleading way of describing the relation between the objects of knowledge and
our knowledge of them’ (Rorty 1998a: 123).
12 Hegel 1995: III, p. 303.
13 McDowell 1995: 887.
14 cf. McDowell 1994: 25–7.
15 For a recent presentation of this ‘textbook’ view, cf. Skorupski 1993: 2:
Kant opened the door to nineteenth-century idealism, and it rushed uncere-
moniously past him, agreeing with him that mind was not a part of nature, but
pressing on boldly to the even more liberating doctrine that nature itself was
an externalization, or self-objectification, of Mind. These ideas developed in
German philosophy from Kant to Hegel.
16 Accounts of Hegel that oppose the traditional view, and so defend a realist inter-
pretation, can be found in Westphal 1989, Wartenberg 1993 and Stern 1990.
17 cf. Hegel 1991: §163, Addition, p. 241:
We must add a remark about the explanation of the origin and formation of
concepts that is usually given in the logic of the understanding. It is not we who
‘form’ concepts, and in general the Concept should not be considered as some-
thing that has come to be at all. Certainly the Concept is not just Being or what is
immediate; because, of course, it involves mediation too. But mediation lies in
the Concept itself, and the Concept is what is mediated by and with itself. It is a
mistake to assume that, first of all, there are objects which form the content of our
representations, and then our subjective activity comes in afterwards to form
concepts of them, through the operation of abstracting that we spoke of earlier,
and by summarising what the objects have in common. Instead, the Concept is
what truly comes first, and things are what they are through the activity of the
Concept that dwells in them and reveals itself in them. This comes up in our reli-
gious consciousness when we say that God created the world out of nothing or,
in other words, that all finite things have emerged from the fullness of God’s
thoughts and from his divine decrees. This involves the recognition that thought,
and, more precisely, the Concept, is the infinite form, or the free, creative activ-
ity that does not need a material at hand in order to realise itself.
18 cf. Hume 1978: Book I, Part IV, Section II, p. 194.
19 Friedman 1996: 443.
20 ibid.
21 A similar point about the significance of receptivity has been made recently by Susan
Haack: see Haack 1996: 308–9:
The point is not that perception does not involve conceptualisation, but that it
also involves something else, something with the potential to surprise us. True,
our perceptual judgments are conceptualized, interpretative; but what testifies
that in perception we are in contact with something real, independent of our
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interpretations, of how anyone thinks it to be, is exactly that potential for
surprise. (As Peirce once put it: ‘A man cannot startle himself by jumping up
with an exclamation of “Boo!”.’)
22 McDowell 1994: 42.
23 Bird 1996; Friedman 1996; Allison 1997.
24 McDowell 1994: 44.
25 ibid., p. 96
26 cf. Bird 1996: 227–9; Friedman 1996: 440–1; Allison 1997: 46. For McDowell’s own
reaction to this charge, see McDowell 1998: 469, fn. 23.
27 McDowell 1994: 10.
28 Hegel 1977: 92–3.
29 Allison 1983: 7.
30 Kant 1933: A26/B42–3.
31 Hegel 1991: §42, Addition 3, pp. 85–6.
32 Hegel 1971: §448 Addition, p. 198.
33 Bird 1996: 241. cf. Bird 1982: 90:
Transcendental Idealism offers in its transcendental distinction between
appearances and intelligible objects a contrast not between a private, eventu-
ally solipsistic, experience and a public experience of outer objects, for that
contrast is already an empirical internal part of our framework. Instead it offers
a contrast between the revisable beliefs which we accept as that framework and
some ultimate form of knowledge in which no revision or change is possible.
Kant has, of course, two qualifications to make to this contrast. First he argues
that such an absolute system of knowledge is beyond our reach, and perhaps
has a function only in its heuristic guidance towards improving our system of
beliefs. Second he is also often thought to hold that certain aspects of our frame-
work, for example those associated with Aristotelian logic and Euclidean
geometry, are strictly unrevisable. If indeed he does hold this latter view, then
we have no need to follow him there. But the basic notion of a relativism which
is for us unavoidable is a fruitful idea with strong echoes in post-Kantian
Idealism and in very recent philosophy.
The reference to post-Kantian Idealism in Bird’s last sentence seems to me evidence enough
that he has misunderstood this aspect of Hegel’s critique of Kant, which is precisely to
arrive at the ‘ultimate form of knowledge’ which Bird is happy to accept as unattainable.
34 See McDowell 1994: 43, fn. 18.
35 The need for this two-fold commitment, in this case in relation to Putnam’s return to
epistemological realism, has been argued recently by John Haldane, in defence of the basi-
cally Aristotelian outlook I have here identified in Hegel: see Haldane 1996. I have argued
that this essentialist realism underpins Hegel’s critique of Kant’s epistemology in Stern 1990.
36 cf. Hegel 1985: 119: ‘Of course philosophy does not restrict itself to things in our
minds but extends also over everything in the external world and so concerns itself with
earthly and finite things.’
37 Thus, the quotation given in the previous note continues: ‘On the other hand, neither
does [philosophy] restrict itself to the mundane; it has also the same aim as religion. And
its mundane subject-matter remains as a determinateness of the divine Idea.’
38 cf. Hegel 1991: §10, pp. 33–4.
39 Hegel 1969: 25–6. cf. also Hegel 1991: §19, Additions, pp. 46–8 where similar senti-
ments are expressed at greater length.
40 Kant 1933: Bxv.
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41 For Hegel’s comparison of Kant and Locke, which I think is important for under-
standing Hegel’s whole attitude to Kant, see Hegel 1977: 68–9.
42 Kant 1933: Axii.
43 This contrast between the Kantian and Hegelian accounts of philosophy and its
standing is noted by Rorty: see Rorty 1980: 132–5:
Kant … managed to transform the old notion of philosophy – metaphysics as
‘queen of the sciences’ because of its concern with what was most universal and
least material – into the notion of a ‘most basic’ discipline – a foundational disci-
pline. Philosophy became ‘primary’ no longer in the sense of ‘highest’ but in the
sense of ‘underlying’ … This Kantian picture of philosophy as centred in episte-
mology, however, won general acceptance only after Hegel and speculative ideal-
ism had ceased to dominate the intellectual scene in Germany … Hegelianism
produced an image of philosophy as a discipline which somehow both completed
and swallowed up the other disciplines, rather than grounding them.
44 Hegel 1985: 62–3.
45 Ameriks 1992: 195.
46 Hegel 1991: §45, Addition, p. 88.
47 cf. Rorty 1996: 36:
The various contemporary contributors to the pragmatist tradition are not
much inclined to insist either on the distinctive nature of philosophy or on the
preeminent place of philosophy within culture as a whole. None of them
believe that philosophers think, or should think, in ways dramatically different
from the ways in which physicists or politicians think.
Whilst McDowell may wish to distance himself from Rorty’s conception of how the prag-
matist tradition should make this case (cf. McDowell 1994: 154–5), he nowhere questions
the tradition itself, accepting that ‘what I recommend could be represented as pragmatism
in Rorty’s sense’ (ibid., p. 155).
48 See Rorty 1982, where Rorty takes Hegel (of all people!) as a spokesman for the kind
of post-Philosophical culture that would dispense with any Platonic self-image (though
Rorty does admit that ‘Hegel himself, to be sure, had his Philosophical moments’ (p. xli)).
49 cf. McDowell 1994: 111:
In that recapitulation of something I said in my last lecture, I have described a
philosophical project: to stand on the shoulders of the giant, Kant, and see our
way to the supersession of traditional philosophy that he almost managed,
though not quite. The philosopher whose achievement that description best fits is
someone we take almost no notice of, in the philosophical tradition I was brought
up in, although I have mentioned him a couple of times before: namely, Hegel.
Of course, much will depend here on what exactly McDowell means by ‘supersession’ and
‘traditional philosophy’: for if the former means ‘Aufhebung’ and if ‘traditional philosophy’
is a certain sort of post-Cartesian problematic, then Hegel can indeed be appropriated in
this way; but if ‘supersession’ is taken more negatively, and the tradition is taken to
include all of philosophical thought (as McDowell’s Wittgensteinian project would seem to
suggest), then I believe he cannot.
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